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Introduction
 “The best way to predict the future is to invent it.”
- Alan Kay, inventor of the Graphical User Interface
The Online Government Task Force was established by the Chief Information Officer to chart
the immediate future course of online government in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Task Force was commissioned to further define, research and evaluate these issues and to
recommend a path forward to realize the promise of online government for the
Commonwealth. Appendix A outlines the mission of the Task Force.
Information technology can reduce costs and enhance service quality of government when
implemented correctly. In this context, “online government” means the use of network
technologies that enable users to access information, people and processes.
Information includes the range of public records as well as data that a particular user has a
right to access but that may be restricted to others. Access to people includes the ability to
communicate with public employees. Processes includes business functions, such as filings,
applications or payments as well as democratic processes, such as participating in meetings,
hearings or even voting from a distance.
The emergence of the World Wide Web and web browsers has provided a simple yet
powerful interface to networks of computers. This interface created an opportunity to open a
wide range of government data and operations to users with unprecedented ease and
effectiveness. However, opening government for online access requires analysis of several
business, technical, legal and policy issues.
This report consists of two parts. Part I distills the research and discussions of the Task Force
into a Vision for online government in Massachusetts, Guiding Principles and
Recommendations for implementation. Part II provides more detailed background information
and research conducted by the Task Force. The Current Status section provides information
on the current technical environment, current department online government initiatives,
legislative and policy initiatives, and industry and academic collaboration. The next section,
Current Available Technology, gives the results of the Request for Information initiated by
the Task Force and suggests an approach for analyzing security and authentication needs. The
enclosed appendices provide more in-depth information about topics highlighted in the report.
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PART I
Vision
"Virtually every public policy area is going to be affected in this new
Information Age - from security, privacy, intellectual property, copyright
protection, universal access to how bit flows are taxed across networks that
largely ignore any kind of political border. Companies are going to invest and
knowledge workers are going to move to those governments who create an
environment where this electronic commerce can flourish."
- Janet Caldow, Director, Institute for Electronic Government
All business and interaction that can be performed at less cost and/or at a higher service
quality if done electronically should be implemented online. This has been the guiding
principle of the Online Government Task Force. The information age affords opportunities
and risks. Some of the risks include: developing systems that can violate privacy interests,
setting government policies that damage the growth of the young electronic commerce
marketplace, or unwisely spending substantial sums of public money on technical solutions
that are not based on business need or are otherwise wasteful. The opportunity is to embrace
online technologies that enable better government. In this context, better government means:
Less: More:
costly efficient
distant accessible
confusing navigable
plodding rapid
conflicting consistent
error prone reliable
bureaucratic responsive
Efficient
Existing paper processes incur a range of cost, not all of which are obvious. Distribution,
delay, archiving and access difficulties are all characteristic of paper-intensive work.
Government is notorious for paper work, and Massachusetts government is no exception.
Government has a duty to the citizens in general, and to the taxpayers in particular to
eliminate waste, fraud, duplication and undue delay in public processes. Wise use of
information technology to enable online government can serve the purpose of delivering
legitimate government services at minimum cost.
While important, cost reductions are only part of the formula for a successful online
government. When implemented properly, online government enhances the quality of service
to citizens, businesses, vendors and others that interact with the state.
Accessible
There should not be a single public agency without a web presence of some kind. Eventually,
every interaction and service should be available online in addition to, or instead of, the
traditional paper form.
The Internet and World Wide Web have enabled access to services “on-demand.” Accessible
government is a key potential benefit of online technologies. To cite a simple example, it is
reasonable to assume that the individual ordering fishing gear from L.L.Bean at midnight
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might also want to obtain a fishing license from the Commonwealth - and so the demand is
created for the same sort of convenient, flexible services from government as from private
entities. Accessibility can be an even more fundamental tool for good governance when made
available for people who can not physically come to the government due to distance, handicap
or other obstacles.
Government on-demand will cause a transformation of the citizen/government,
business/government, and government/government relationships. New networks for
information access and feedback will be created where customization replaces
standardization, business becomes streamlined - many services can be accessed via a common
‘point of entry’ rather than via numerous entry points, flat organizations replace hierarchies,
timely feedback replaces long response times, simple processes replace complex, bureaucratic
ones. With the essential pieces of the business, technical and policy structures in place, the
state can become a collaborative inter-networked organization spanning state and local
governments, schools, libraries, businesses, health care and other sectors. Services are
delivered to citizens where they want it -- at home, at school, in the workplace, at public
access points - anywhere.
Navigable
Once government services and other interactions are available online, another critical quality
factor will be the navigability of those sites. The larger or more complex online interactions
become, the more difficult they can be for a user to find, sift through and complete. Lack of
adequate search engines or more sophisticated customer-focused navigation tools can defeat
the entire online government enterprise.
Eventually some citizens will need to communicate with a live human. Online systems that
allow users to communicate with personnel at an "electronic help desk" will also be
necessary. Such online help desks can provide more robust tools for assisting users –
including collaborative web browsing, assistance actually filling out online forms, avoiding
simultaneous voice and data connections, etc. Navigational tools, including live help, will be
important methods of delivering data and services that are simpler to locate and to understand
in context.
Rapid
Unlike the paper-based counterpart, an online interaction can and should be more rapidly
initiated and accomplished. The velocity made possible by online government should be
carefully incorporated into the design and planning of each interaction so as to avoid choke
points and needless delay at any phase of the life cycle of the interaction. Eliminating the
paper from all phases of a given system can increase velocity.
Consistent
The transition to online government will further expose the inconsistencies among existing
government activities as well as among newly created online systems. The act of making
government available online creates a transparency that would not otherwise exist. The online
interface of government must present a "single face" of government. Just as paving a cow
path is not necessarily wise public planning, so too will it be important to revisit the
assumptions and habits underlying current public activities as the online designs are being
formed. This process must be done in coordination with all agencies so as to assure an online
presence that is consistent with itself.
The risk of creating “government only” solutions that require installed bases or practices that
are inconsistent with or, worse yet, in conflict with private electronic commerce practice is
serious. Such a result would harm development of a critical Massachusetts and national
market – the emerging electronic commerce marketplace.
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A business or citizen who is deciding what electronic commerce tools to invest in should
never be faced with a choice between general private commercial uses and different
requirements to interact with government. However, if we continue to track closely with
emerging standards and practices in the private sector, then government can actually enhance
the growth of this market by making the value proposition even better for the person who uses
electronic commerce tools because the tools will work equally for all their public and private
sector needs. This ultimately redounds to the benefit of government as well, because it will
make it easier for online government applications to be used less expensively and more
widely.
Ultimately, the quality of serious online transactions will also depend on minimum base-line
consistency among each level of government and between the public and private sectors. For
example, the authentication, payment and interface requirements should not be in conflict.
Reliable
Though some reactively feel that electronic transactions are inherently less safe than paper-
based transactions, in fact, when implemented soundly, the online system can be far more
reliable. The ability to detect, and correct or flag errors is important. Data can be validated
and entered automatically into databases to minimize the possibility of data entry errors.
Similarly, appropriate levels of information security can reduce rates of crime and fraud
perpetrated upon systems.
Responsive
Finally, online government can mean greater responsiveness and accountability by public
servants to the constituency. The management and technical infrastructure should allow more
direct communication and information flow with the constituent. To the maximum extent
practicable, rigid and bureaucratic mechanisms should be designed out of the online
government interaction. The process of interaction should permit more options and
customization for constituent needs, treating the citizens like customers.
Envision the following scenarios
For the Business Partner of the Commonwealth:
Access key financial data - such as the status of a payment for a vendor, or the status of
certain accounts - via a secure Web front end to a back-end system. Online payment methods
are both accepted and available through the web. The risks of fraud and mistake are handled
by security technologies settled by the partners through additional agreements specifying
trade practices.
For an Organization Doing Business in the Commonwealth
All the forms, information and contact people associated with a regulation or a transaction
with the government are available for process in one place and at the click of a button. You
can track and manage the progress of your application or other transaction through the
government process via online media. The forms, applications, correspondence, etc. are
signed with a digitized signature device that combines biometric data with the document that
invalidates the signature if any change is made in the document.
For a Citizen of the Commonwealth:
Finding out about meetings and hearings that affect you becomes simple and you can
participate online without having to actually come to the State House or other government
facility in person. You can communicate with public officials and staff directly in a virtual
office setting. The citizen uses the same smart card, or public key digital certificate, or
signature digitizer or any commercially standard security device that they use in private
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transactions. The government solution requires no hardware, software or practices that differ
from the citizens’ existing installed base of security solutions.
How do we get there?
Realizing the vision will involve building a sturdy foundation. This foundation will have
management and leadership components, policy components, and technology components. In
addition, in order to fully take advantage of evolving technological capabilities and provide
the highest levels of service in the new environment, leaders will need to take a hard look at
how business is conducted today in order to identify how it might be improved.
The work that lies ahead includes:
¨ building a "trustworthy" infrastructure which assures authentication, integrity,
confidentiality, access control and non-repudiation of transactions,
¨ creating the human infrastructure and service mechanisms to support the new
“trustworthy” infrastructure,
¨ fostering more and better inter-organizational communication and collaboration
(state-to-state, state to federal, state to local),
¨ creating a legal environment conducive to online government and eliminating
regulatory barriers to electronic commerce,
¨ developing administrative controls which can be built into systems as simple
rules and checks to replace traditional business controls which will be lost in
automated information/transaction systems,
¨ ensuring new systems provide ubiquitous access, consistent interfaces and
requirements ("one face"), ease of use, and are interoperable.
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Guiding Principles
As we proceed to implement our vision of Online Government, our work should be guided by
the following principles:
¨ Create no new regulatory or bureaucratic apparatus (eliminate existing apparatus
where possible)
¨ Target initial resources toward the best business case for technology, not just the
neatest technology
¨ Target security resources to what is needed for a given system - rather than the
maximum for all systems
¨ Avoid direct competition with private sector providers of service or products
¨ Design and build solutions that promote a "single face" of government (at all
levels of government)
¨ Implement solutions that leverage users existing private electronic commerce
practices and technology
¨ Develop, organize and present online data and processes to suit the citizen or
business, not government
The following section outlines specific recommendations in two general categories: Business
and Technical.
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Recommendations
Business
1. Develop a Web presence for every Department accessible via the
Commonwealth MAGNet home page.
2. Increase agencies’ Web presence by:
2.1. Publishing major work products on-line
2.2. Enabling customer inquiries on-line
2.3. Handling core business transactions on-line, (i.e. Permits, Licenses, Filings, etc.)
3. Collaborate across agencies to:
3.1. Identify and analyze common business practices
3.2. Transform and centralize common business practices across organizational
boundaries
4. Enhance communication and collaboration across agencies through:
4.1. An online government Web site
4.2. Tracking and publicizing department online government projects
4.3. Common interest databases and discussion tools
4.4. An interdepartmental online government project group that holds regular meetings
to discuss issues, technologies and products, and best practices
5. Develop state-wide policies, guidelines, and legislation in the following areas:
5.1. Privacy
5.2. Management of Electronic Records
5.3. Amendment of old “ quill pen” laws
5.4. Web-based revenue generation
5.5. Security
6. Develop and implement a statewide coordinated authentication strategy to
minimize costs and reduce risks to the Commonwealth through:
6.1. The appropriate use of standards, including the safeguarding of privacy
6.2. A framework for performing cost-benefit and risk analyses to compare PKI versus
other security and authentication approaches
6.3. Shared certificates and certificate policies
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Technical
1. Develop Public Access infrastructure as an enterprise-wide baseline
1.1. Publicize the current technical architecture and network security
requirements
1.2. Re-assess the current architecture and security requirements on an ongoing
basis to support evolving Department needs and available technologies
2. Implement TCP/IP to desktops in all agencies to achieve:
2.1. Adherence to a standard network protocol
2.2. Adherence to an open system communication protocol
2.3. Enable a standard client interface through the use of Web browsers
3. Develop a menu of Security and Authentication options to support various
applications and transactions in conjunction with the development of Business
Recommendations section 5.5 and 6.
4. Develop Application guidance that addresses at a minimum:
4.1. ADA requirements
4.2. Look and feel
4.3. Site design
4.4. Performance standards
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PART II
Current Status of Online Government in Massachusetts
Background
As a result of two Information Technology (IT) bond authorizations in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, the first enacted by the legislature in 1992, and the second enacted in 1996, IT
development projects have been built and implemented by various agencies throughout state
government to meet particular business needs. Some of these projects have brought services
to a wider user population because they have been made available to users via the Internet and
the World Wide Web. For example, the Registry of Motor Vehicles now provides a way for
drivers to renew their vehicle registration or pay fines via the RMV Web site. While these IT
investments have been successful for their particular organizations, over the last year,
attention has begun to focus on how to leverage the growing number of online, automated
systems and the maturing Internet-based service capabilities to create a more comprehensive
vision of integrated, online Government services via the Web which cross organizational
boundaries.
Certain agencies in state government have gained substantial experience with online systems
development and new technology deployment. The Commonwealth’s Chief Information
Officer, Louis Gutierrez, decided to tap that growing knowledge base to create the Online
Government Task Force. The Task Force was charged to help chart the immediate future
course of online government in the Commonwealth by defining a vision for online
government, assessing the current environment (from both a technical and a policy/legal
standpoint), identifying emerging common applications ripe for Internet and Web
implementation, reviewing currently available technology offerings of interest, and then
reporting on our findings and making recommendations for further action.
The Task Force began by identifying and evaluating applications with varying security and
authentication requirements, which were used as examples to frame a Request for Information
(RFI) on products and services to meet these needs. The information gained from that RFI is
detailed in this report and will inform the Task Force’s findings and recommendations. The
Task Force also conducted a survey of existing and planned online government projects
throughout the Commonwealth. This survey provided an indication of current online
government initiatives that are deemed important by agencies.
Internal Current Computing Environment
MAGNet, the Internet and Current Public Access Architecture
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts' internal network is called MAGNet, short for
Massachusetts Access to Government Networks. It is a TCP/IP routed network, utilizing 245
Cisco routers strategically located throughout the Commonwealth. MAGNet provides 151
State agencies with high-speed frame relay, centrally managed connections. This network
allows agencies to access many Commonwealth resources including the mainframe systems
and the Information Warehouse and also provides the capability for interagency
communication. TCP/IP has been implemented in approximately 60% of the
Commonwealth's agencies to date.
Local Area Networks (LANs) in the Commonwealth currently run several operating systems,
including Windows NT, Novell NETWARE and Banyan Vines operating systems. The
current Commonwealth standard stipulates at a minimum Windows NT Server Version 4.0,
Banyan VINES 6.3 with TCP/IP Server-to-Server Option for remote TCP/IP access and
Novell NETWARE Version 4.1 with TCP/IP Option(s) such as Novix or LAN Workplace.
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The current desktop PC standard for new purchases is a 200 MHz Pentium processor with 32
MB memory and a 10/100 MB Ethernet network interface card. The operating system is 32-
bit Microsoft Windows (either Windows 95 or Windows NT 4.0 Workstation) with an
Internet Web Browser (either MS Internet Explorer 3.0 or higher or Netscape Navigator 3.0 or
higher).
GTE/BBN and MCI provide Internet access, with high-speed connections to MAGNet
through the ITD Network Control Center. Security is maintained via a firewall, through which
all traffic to and from the Internet passes. Internet users can be securely connected to network
resources within MAGNet via specially configured and protected servers. Commonwealth
agencies can obtain additional information about the current Public Access Architecture by
contacting the Information Technology Division.
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts Web Site
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts web server is home to web sites for eighty state
agencies and handles 3 million file requests monthly. The Internet Services Group within the
Information Technology Division provides consulting services and training to state agencies
as well as server space at no cost. An average of three agency web sites have been added each
month over the past two years. Unfortunately, many agencies and other public entities still
have no web presence on the state web site.
Through the state’s web site, agencies have been able to make their information available to a
wider audience without the incremental costs associated with paper distribution. The state
web site has been the source of publishing “firsts” for the Commonwealth: the Comptroller’s
financial statements, the Governor’s budget recommendations, employment statistics, and
local aid announcements are among the materials that can be found on the web when or
before a paper copy is available. As discussed later in this report, agency sites are beginning
to go beyond publishing to more interactive applications such as accessing bid solicitations
and renewing automobile registrations.
X.500 Directory Server
The Commonwealth possesses an X.500 Directory Server. X.500 is not a database (though it
may use one). In its basic definition X.500 is a technical architecture for constructing a
directory service according to a defined set of standards.
The directory itself is a hybrid repository/index/pointer to objects. “Objects” is meant in both
the data and physical sense (the data may at times point to a physical location). Standardized
X.500 data object classes define the directory entries by specifying which attributes can and
must be associated with each particular object class for entries assigned to a particular object
class.
The “authoritative” source of the directory information is typically maintained elsewhere - but
is loaded into the directory, with appropriate mapping of entries to X.500 object
classes/attributes, for centralized “normalization”/access to that information. Multiple sources
may be used in combination to construct entries. Given this positioning of the technology,
following are some examples of how X.500 can be used:
¨ White Pages—for e-mail addresses, URLs, Postal Address,
employment/employee information, all types of public resource information
(including recreation information, assistance programs, government policies,
etc.),
¨ Public Key Infrastructure support (X.509/LDAP, in particular) to store and
manage user authentication certificates,
¨ Interface to Smart Card ID cards with all applicable applications of such, e.g.,
authorizations, building security, registration/enrollment purposes,
¨ For application program reference, e.g., CommBridge.
Keeping in mind that since the directory is a repository of “pointers”/”indexes” and not the
“authority”, information can be made available to people/applications without jeopardizing or
compromising the source systems. Multiple images of the directory can be constructed so that
depending upon authorizations a subset of information is available for query. Internet
technologies - Web and LDAP, in particular, provide the access mechanisms to the
information. However, within the Commonwealth, at this time the dominant use of the
technology has been with E-mail.
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The Comm-Bridge project provides the internal framework for secure, authenticated
application to application level communications within the state network. This system uses
public key certificates to authenticate applications and devices on the network.
Current Online Government Initiatives
Agency Projects
The Task Force conducted an investigation of current online government initiatives within the
Commonwealth. As part of this investigation, the Task Force drafted a survey which was
distributed to each executive branch agency and other segments of government. The survey
questions were designed to ascertain the scope, security requirements, payment features and
stage of completion for each initiative.
The table below indicates the short project description and the agency involved with each
application. A total of 35 projects are listed.
Agency Project
Bureau of Special Investigations Investigator's System
Campaign and Political Finance OCPF Web site
Committee For Public Counsel Services PC BILL
Department of Correction Inmate Research Statistics project
Department of Housing and Community
Development
Client and Fiscal Management System (CAFMIS)- IT2
Department of Revenue Tax Exempt/Resale Certificate Verification
Department of Revenue Corporate/Personal Income Tax Extensions
Department of Revenue Customer Feedback Form
Department of Revenue Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) Application
Department of Revenue Taxpayer Change of Address Form
Division of Banks Authenticated Internet Forms Filing
EOHHS Client Index
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs Internet Access to GIS
Executive Office of Public Safety Public Safety's Non-Confidential Information
Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental Law
Enforcement
SPORT
General Court Massachusetts General Laws Online
Holyoke Community College Student registration over the Web
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Agency Project
Holyoke Community College Student access to personal information
Mass Highway Incident Management
Mass Highway Federal Highway Electronic Data Exchange
Mass Highway Traffic Video Information
Mass Highway GIS Map
Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission (MAC) Airport Information Management System (AIMS)
Mount Wachusett Community College Distance Learning
North Shore Community College EDE
North Shore Community College State SQL server for spending plan
North Shore Community College Banner Web for Student
Office of the Comptroller MMARSWeb/ManagerMMars
Office of the Comptroller MMARSWeb/VendorWeb
Office of the Comptroller MMARSWeb/WEBWarehouse
Operational Services Division Procurement Desktop
Operational Services Division Comm-Pass
Registry of Motor Vehicles Express Lane
Secretary of State Voter Information
Worcester State College Colleague INTERNET Access
A copy of the Survey and cover letter as well as a more detailed spreadsheet containing the
survey results can be found in Appendix B. The following charts provide an analysis of the
results in certain key areas:
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While the majority of Department projects are still in the Concept or Design stage, it is
significant to note that work is already being done on 13 projects.
The chart above categorizes the projects according to the relationship between the agencies
and the target audiences for the applications. This relationship is a key determinant of the
level and type of authentication that will be needed for individual applications. The term
“internal” is used to encompass entities within State government and its agencies such as
employees. “External” is used to refer to entities outside of State government such as vendors
and citizens. “Known” entities are those with whom the Commonwealth has a previously
established relationship such as contracted vendors and service recipients. “Unknown” entities
do not have existing relationships with the Commonwealth such as an anonymous member of
the general public or a new vendor responding to a solicitation request.
RELATIONSHIPS
UNKNOWN
KNOWN
0 9
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
7 11
8
STAGE OF COMPLETION
15
7
13 Concept
Design
Work being done
Page 15
The majority of projects (26) involve kn wn internal or external entities or a combination of
both. Only 9 projects involve unknown external entities. However, most of these applications
involve the provision of public information for which authentication would not be necessary.
The need for authentication will vary based on the particular application and will depend on
an evaluation of the risks, the benefits and the costs of levels of authentication. In the case of
known parties, we assume that authentication will be easier to implement because of existing
agreements, communications or other available methods of identification. Likewise,
authentication should be easier to implement with internal parties than with external parties.
The majority of applications (28) may be accessed by external parties through the Internet.
Many can also be accessed within the state’s Network (MAGNet).
Some of the online government applications deserve special consideration. These "killer
apps" are examples of the new model for delivery of state services:
The Division of Banks
Each week the Division of Banks (DOB) publishes a Consumer Credit Guide. To qualify for
inclusion into the weekly guide a participant must be a licensed mortgage lender or a state or
federally chartered financial institution and the Division verifies that each entity is in fact able
to participate. DOB is piloting a new process whereby, instead of a manual, FAX-based
procedure, banks use the Internet to access DOB’s Web site. The DOB pilot attempts to create
authentication using an X.509v3 public key certificate. They will use this authentication to
enable banks and other financial institutions to report and attest to their interest rates (file
forms) with the Massachusetts Division of Banks over the Internet and be assured that the
Division of Banks has accurately received and recorded the information. At the same time,
DOB will be assured (via the certification authority) that the reporting institutions are
“authentic” (legitimate) and will have the digital signature of the financial institution as a
record of the completed transmission.
The Registry of Motor Vehicles
The Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) has a series of online transactions available on the
Internet. Using SSL2 security, the RMV accepts credit cards as payment for citations,
registration renewals, ordering a special plate, and requesting a duplicate registration
EXTERNAL ACCESS THROUGH INTERNET
28
7
Access through
Internet enabled
Access through
Internet not enabled
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certificate. SSL2 was used for these RMV transactions because they require only
confidentiality and not authentication (SSL2 does not provide authentication). Over 32,000
people have taken advantage of this new form of government access since July 1996.
Additionally, ordering vanity plates, requesting driving history, and reserving road exam test
time will soon be available.
Operational Services Division
The Operation Services Division (OSD) has launched Comm-PASS (Commonwealth
Procurement Access & Solicitation System) which is designed to advertise solicitations
(RFRs) on the Internet.  The system has the capability to both advertise the existence of the
solicitation and distribute it by allowing the user to download the solicitation files. The system
is available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.  A department can advertise a procurement and
distribute the bidding materials as files. This allows the department to save on printing and
mailing costs. The department must also post the result of the procurement (who bid, winning
bidder, etc.) in Comm-PASS. This allows the vendors to know who won without calling the
procurement staff, saving both parties time.
Legislative and Policy Issues and Initiatives
Some of the major policy issues facing the Commonwealth with regard to the deployment of
Online Government and Electronic Commerce revolve around authentication, privacy and the
fairness of information practices related to the creation, storage, use, modification, disclosure
and destruction of electronic records that personally identify an individual or contain
otherwise sensitive data. The extent to which authentication is required in the first place is
itself a policy – not a technical – issue.
The ITD Office of the General Counsel has worked on several privacy issues related to
electronic records systems for the Commonwealth. The Deputy General Counsel for the
Information Technology Division has testified before Congress on issues of electronic data
privacy (written testimony available at: http://www.tiac.net/biz/danielg). The Commonwealth
should not require authentication of an individual where it is not necessary to accomplish the
underlying transaction.
For example, there will be situations where the Commonwealth has no direct interest in the
individual who conducts a given transaction, but does need assurance that the user is
authorized or maintains a particular role within an organization. Similarly, there may be a
place for pseudonyms or anonymous transactions where appropriate. If uthentication occurs,
then the Commonwealth should assure that the personally identifiable data is kept in
accordance with fair information practices guidelines and is treated with the highest
appropriate care. More information on the privacy and fair information practices issues
presented by electronic authentication and records systems is included in Appendix E of this
document.
The Commonwealth must also grapple with the extent to which we permit private sector
parties to create, manage, sell or otherwise control public information that is in electronic
form. Some states have “out-sourced” the management of their official web sites, for
example. In such arrangements, the private sector vendors will typically cover costs and
create profits by selecting some data or processes to withhold from the public unless a
subscription or other fee is paid to the vendor. This subscription may be for so-called “value
added” data or services, such as online transaction systems that the vendor provides to state
agencies. It remains to be determined whether such arrangements would be in the public
interest or would risk over-commercialization of processes and data which would otherwise
be free for public access.
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Another area of concern relates to the accessibility of online resources to all citizens. As
mentioned earlier, a key potential benefit of Online Government will be the easier
accessibility of data to the public. However, the government, as an organization that is
accountable to all the people, must also consider the equity of making data or resources
available online when many citizens still do not have access to computer resources.
Furthermore, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) must also be applied to all online
resources to assure handicapped citizens are not unduly disadvantaged by the presentation of
data via online methods that can not be accessed due to disability (such as blindness). More
information is available on how to assure online government compliance with the ADA in
Appendix E of this document.
Underlying all these policy concerns is the more fundamental principle of governance. It is
the citizen’s constitutional right that their government be accountable to the governed at all
times and in all activities. Using online government to reduce costs and enhance service
quality serves the deeper purpose of maintaining high levels of responsiveness and
accountability to the self-governed.
Proposed Massachusetts Electronic Records and Signature Act
One of the factors slowing more widespread use of the Internet for government transactions is
the legal uncertainty surrounding the use of electronic media rather than traditional paper-
based systems. For example, a search of the Massachusetts General Laws reveals over 4,500
sections that refer either to written documents or signed documents. This has generated
substantial uncertainty as to whether an electronic transaction will have binding legal effect.
To address this uncertainty, the Information Technology Division, at the direction of the
Executive Office for Administration and Finance, has been working to draft legislation that
would confirm the ability of state agencies to use electronic transactions even when there is a
law requiring a written or a signed instrument. The Massachusetts Electronic Records and
Signatures Act (MERSA) is designed to validate online government without forcing agencies
to abandon paper-based systems until they are ready to do so. A copy of the latest version of
MERSA is available on the ITD legal department’s web site
(http://www.state.ma.us/itd/legal).
In brief, MERSA states that where any law requires a writing, that law is satisfied by a
“record.” The statute defines a record as “information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form . . .
[including] electronic records and written records.” Regarding signatures, MERSA provides
that where any law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met by that person’s
electronic signature. In addition, MERSA explicitly states that agencies “may create and
receive electronic records in lieu of written records, and may also convert written records to
electronic records.” Realizing that not all agencies are ready to support electronic
transactions, MERSA provides that nothing in the statute shall be construed to require any
agency to use or permit the use of electronic records or signatures. MERSA also enables non-
governmental electronic commerce transactions between private sector parties. However,
nothing in MERSA would change or limit existing consumer protection provisions of law.
While several states have already adopted so-called “digital signature” laws, MERSA
represents a new approach that is rapidly gaining favor with other states. Unlike the first
digital signature law enacted by Utah, MERSA is “technology neutral” in that it does not
specify the type of technology that parties must use to gain the benefits of the law’s
provisions. In addition, MERSA is non-regulatory, whereas Utah-style laws impose stringent
licensure requirements for certain companies that provide services related to digital
signatures. A recent Internet Law and Policy Forum study of state electronic signature
legislation shows that the trend among states adopting such laws is distinctly toward the
Massachusetts approach.
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Relationship with Other States and the Federal Government
The Commonwealth has collaborated closely with the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law on the drafting committee for the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA.). In addition to the Commonwealth’s formal committee membership, the Information
Technology Division has actively assisted the UETA drafters, based on MERSA. As a result,
official comments to the UETA cite MERSA in several sections. The Information Technology
Division, through the Office of the General Counsel, has also been involved in Electronic
Commerce legal reforms within other states and state organizations. The Deputy General
Counsel (DGC) for ITD has formally testified or presented on these issues before the National
Governor’s Association, the Western Governor’s Association, the states of Rhode Island,
Tennessee, West Virginia, Mississippi and other venues.
The Commonwealth has also been a leading coordinator of the federal-state relationship on
these law and policy issues. Governor Weld joined the United States Innovation Partnership –
an initiative of the National Governor’s Association and the White House Office of
Technology Policy created to coordinate technology policy at the national level between
states and the federal government. The DGC has served as the USIP Governor’s Alternate
under the Weld and Cellucci administrations. In this organization, the Commonwealth has led
development of an experimental Internet web site for collaborative discussion of electronic
commerce law and policy. The web server is hosted at the University of Massachusetts and is
used by state and federal policy makers in both the executive and legislative branches as a
two-way communications and update tool.
The DGC has testified before the Senate and Congress on multiple occasions as federal
legislators seek information and direction on electronic authentication and data privacy
legislation. The written testimony is available at www.st e.ma.us/itd/legal. As part of this
cooperative posture with our federal partners, the Office of the General Counsel has also
assisted Congressional staff with the drafting of federal bills, including H.R. 299, the
“Electronic Commerce Enhancement Act of 1997.” Specifically, the DGC’s contributions led
to provisions in the legislation that assure the technical standards for federal government
electronic forms “shall be compatible with standards and technology for digital signatures
used in commerce and industry and by State governments.” This language directly reflects the
Commonwealth’s position of supporting and using private sector technical standards in
government operations and policy. The DGC has also presented at federal agencies, such as
the “Access America” conference of the National Performance Review, and the “Public
Forum on Certificate Authorities and Digital Signatures” by the National Institute for
Standards and Technology. In addition, the DGC has consulted with federal policy makers
regarding electronic commerce issues, including Ira Magaziner, Special Advisor to the
President of the United States.
Industry Collaboration
The Certificate Authority Ratings and Trust Task Force of the Internet Council
Late in 1996, the Office of the General Counsel of ITD, in conjunction with the Office of the
Director of the Digital Signature Program for the State of Utah, agreed to organize a meeting
to discuss the creation of general market based accreditation standards for use of digital
signatures and Certificate Authorities. Soon, Carolyn Purcell, CIO for the state of Texas and
then President of the National Association of State Information Resource Executives agreed
to take the leadership for pulling this meeting together. The meeting was attended by several
states, U.S. Federal agencies, representatives from several countries, every major Certificate
Authority, IBM, Microsoft, Netscape, National Computer Security Association, Novell, Open
Market, Deloitte & Touche LLP, the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative, Telecom
Ireland, Stanford Law School’s Law and Technology Policy Center, and the United States
Council for International Business.
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By the end of the collaboration, three state associations—the National Association of State
Information Resource Executives (NASIRE), the National Association of State Auditors,
Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT), and the National Association of State Purchasing
Officials (NASPO) -- and their state government members had assumed a coordinated
leadership role on this issue. The three associations agreed to work through membership to the
Internet Council of the National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA) as an open
and participatory private sector based forum within which to grapple with these issues. In this
forum, the states are working with Federal government and private sector representatives to
develop a market-based means to evaluate or rate the trustworthiness and performance of
certification authorities issuing digital certificates as part of a PKI-based electronic commerce
solution. As of the publication date of this report, some 14 state governments are paid-
members participating in this effort. The initiative is taking place under the Certificate
Authority Ratings and Trust Task Force (CARAT) of N CHA’s Internet Council.
The CARAT Task Force is working on the development of market-based rules and standards
for the evaluation and rating of certification authorities and the certificates they issue. For PKI
to be truly useful as a serious business tool, subscribers, relying parties and the general public
must have confidence that CA’s will be held accountable for their performance and services,
with appropriate liabilities established. However, a trustworthy system must also take into
account the rights and responsibilities of the other parties involved.
Through participation in the ANT Work Group’s CA pilot, and research and collaboration
with other industry and government efforts related to CA accreditation and evaluation,
CARAT task force members are striving to develop a uniform regimen of metrics, processes
and standards (operating rules or “named policies”). These named policies would support the
use of registered certificate policies and specified types of transactions conducted on open
networks and supported by an “open but bounded” public key infrastructure (PKI), usable by
both private sector and government organizations. A related intent is to use the certificate
policies as the basis for a controlled test of service applications in a real operational setting
among public and private sector members of the Internet Council.
Academic and Educational Collaboration
The Information Technology Division hosted a public briefing by the National Research
Council on their report: "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society." The
briefing was held at the Gardener Auditorium in the State House on Wednesday, August 7,
1996. Co-sponsored by the Boston ar Association’s Computer Law Committee and the
Boston Computer Society Legal Group, this briefing brought together members of the
academic, financial services, government and technology sectors of Massachusetts to discuss
national cryptography policy and the role of state government. This was an example of state
government acting as a convener of major policy debates in a public, non-partisan forum.
More information on this event is available at http://www.tiac.net/biz/bcslegal/nrc1.htm.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have
cooperated to explore technical, design and policy issues in an academic setting. The Deputy
General Counsel for the Information Technology Division holds an academic appointment as
lecturer at MIT, where he teaches at the graduate level on topics of electronic commerce,
virtual communities and online government. In 1997, the graduate course: “Virtual State
House” generated several working prototypes of virtual reality, multi-user online government
environments. In the Spring of 1998, the graduate course: “Designing Electronic Commerce
and Online Government” is exploring the relationship between technology and policy in the
design and implementation of online transactional systems.
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Current Available Technology
Excerpt from: "States' Role in Developing Digital Signatures Policies and
Standards"
States, like other levels of government, have an interest in the promotion of
electronic commerce. The government at all levels has a duty to seek efficiencies
in the delivery of government services by reducing costs and enhancing service
quality. Modern economic development policies should specifically promote
electronic commerce in the private sector. Digital signatures are an important
tool to enable secure electronic commerce and the technology underlying such
signatures requires special attention.
- Statement by the Legislative and Policy Work Group of the Information
Security Committee of the American Bar Association, 7.31.97
The Task Force investigated several technologies with an eye toward solutions that are cost-
effective and which meet our business needs for implementing systems that are simple and
efficient for the user. Much of the attention of the Task Force was focused on information
security technology, and particularly on implementations of public key cryptography. The use
of so-called digital signatures was a major issue. Please see Appendix D for more information
on Electronic Authentication.
Topics discussed included: how the key and certificates should be generated and managed; to
what extent, if any, should the Commonwealth act as our own Certificate Authority (CA),
what existing business lines would benefit from use of digital signatures, how would various
CA’s certificates be handled technically by the Commonwealth, what criteria will the
Commonwealth use to determine which CAs will be deemed sufficient for a given
transaction, and what policies would promote the broadest use of the fewest certificates by a
citizen with agencies.
The Task Force determined that it is too early to definitively decide these issues because this
entire area is still maturing. These issues are also the topic of discussion at the federal, state
and private sector levels. Efforts are underway to pilot new technologies and coordinate
efforts to ensure the interoperability of approaches. The Commonwealth needs to continue its
involvement with these various groups and continue to identify Department requirements with
the goal of articulating a coordinated statewide approach.
Technology Matrix
The Task Force issued a Request for Information (RFI) to vendors with the goal of seeking
information on products and services that will enable the Commonwealth to use the Internet
and internal networks for secure messaging and transactions. The RFI document is included
with this report as Appendix C.
The RFI elicited a number of responses, ranging from descriptions of available technology to
offers of integration and planning services. The RFI responses are summarized in the
following matrix. Complete RFI responses are available for review at ITD.
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RFI
Respondent
Product/Service
Description
What does it do? What does it
cost?
Andersen
Consulting
PLANNING SERVICES
Andersen provides no
specific products or
solutions in this response.
They offer several
strategies for providing
secure Internet services.
To provide specific
solutions Andersen
requests further information
regarding the
Commonwealth’s security
policies.
This response provides
overviews of the latest
Internet security systems
(hardware, software, and
services).  Andersen
needs further information
from the Commonwealth
including security policies
and hardware
requirements.
No specific costs are
discussed.  The
response states if the
Commonwealth
selected Andersen as
a “full-solution
partner”, instead of
disparate hardware
and software vendors,
the implementation of
on-line government
would be cost neutral.
BBN Planet SERVICE
BBN proposed several
ideas for specific solutions
for the Commonwealth.
BBN proposed the use of
encryption technology,
SecureID cards, and SSL
public key exchanges
among other approaches.
BBN’s solution will
incorporate 4
qualifications for secure
electronic transactions:
1) user is certain of
communication with
correct server.
2) server is certain of user
identity
3) information transmitted
is kept between user and
server
4) user and server can be
certain information does
not alter during
transmission process.
No specific costs were
provided.  BBN will
provide another
proposal when the
details of the
particular application
are known.
BBN requires use of
commercial web
browsers and can
recommend proper
software.
Control Data COMBINATION:
PRODUCTS & SERVICE
Control Data offers a
combination of their own
x.500 directory along with
technology from Entrust
(see above) to provide
secure web-based
electronic commerce.
Control Data’s security
technology includes digital
certificates to authenticate
users and protect the
desktop; public key
cryptography and virus
protection to safeguard
messages; and firewall
and virtual private network
management for network
security.  All features can
be integrated into the
X.500 system now being
used by the state.
No specific costs
provided.
EDS SERVICES
EDS offers the
ImagineCard solution.
ImagineCard is part of
EDS’ HP Praesidium
Enterprise Security
Framework.
The ImagineCard solution
combines smartcard
technology with the latest
advances in public/private
key cryptography to
provide strong security for
electronic transactions.
ImagineCard is a
component of the HP
Praesidium Enterprise
Security Framework
offering several security
products to lessen the risk
of doing Internet
business.
EDS mentions
situational costs.
However, without
further specifics they
cannot craft complete
solutions with
associated costs.
Entegrity
Solutions
PRODUCTS
Products offer a series of
services:
NotaryPlus provides CA
framework.
AssureWeb provides
access control.
SignOn provides
authentication for the entire
Entegrity’s products
provide proper
authentication, access
control, privacy and non-
repudiation needed for all
secured electronic
transactions.
This combination of
products allows the
Solution requires
about $30,000 of
server based
software.
Client side software
and support is $36.
Certificates per-
issuance will cost
between $2-3.
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RFI
Respondent
Product/Service
Description
What does it do? What does it
cost?
Entegrity
Solutions
(cont.)
session.
Mailer provides
encryption/decryption.
Security Development
Platform provides
integration for all aspects of
security system.
Commonwealth to
become their own CA or
they can enlist a separate
service.
Entrust PRODUCTS
Entrust offers security
products, public key
infrastructure, and key
management architecture
The products are X.509
based.
Entrust offers a full range
of public key infrastructure
products and system
solutions.   Entrust
recognizes the cycle of a
key across the enterprise
system and ensures its
compatibility.
Costs estimate for
server hardware is
$6,000 per 5000
users.  Client licensing
costs are $159
(negotiable) per user.
GTE SERVICE/PRODUCTS
GTE offers deployment of
enterprise-wide
authentication and access
control systems using
X.509 digital certificates.
GTE Cybertrust is the
certification authority.
GTE offers Enterprise
Information Access.  By
using GTE CyberTrust to
generate X.509
certificates, they are able
to provide secure and
authenticated Internet
access.
No specific costs were
provided.  Client will
need a PC web
browser.  Central web
server hardware and
software are required.
The Commonwealth
can buy a CA server
or use the services of
GTE.  GTE identifies
that the main cost will
be in system
integration.
IBM PRODUCTS
IBM offers security
products and certification
authority services.  IBM
also provides
authentication and
encryption based on X.509
certificates.
Strategy relies on access
control lists for
application, transaction
and data security.  The
IBM Vault Depositor
server can support both
persistent and non-
persistent Web-to-host
connections.
Hardware and
software purchase
required.  Solution
costs not provided in
response.
KPMG Peat
Marwick LLP
SYSTEM INTEGRATION
SERVICES
KPMG outlines their own
“solution architecture”
using numerous
technologies.  The core of
their offer however is
consulting services.
Their solution architecture
uses firewall technologies
to separate the public
Internet from the internal
networks of the
Commonwealth with a
“demilitarized zone”
(DMZ).  Servers on the
DMZ provide user
authentication, user
access restriction, and
bind users to their
submissions.
No specific costs
provided.
N*Able PRODUCTS
N*Able offers enabling
smart card technology for
the Secure Electronic
Transaction (SET)
standard.
Product is a low-cost
smart card to hold private
certificate and credit card
information.  Technology
relies upon digital
certificate to secure a
transaction.  Cards are
designed for usage with
the SET protocol to
facilitate transactions
between consumers and
merchants.  Card
scanning device for PC
necessary.
N*Able smart cards
are offered in range
from $2.00 to $25.00.
NetDox SECURE TRANSMISSION
SERVICES
NetDox offers a pay-per-
Characterized as an
“Assured Electronic
Information Delivery
Costs include a per-
message charge of
$6.85 for packages up
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RFI
Respondent
Product/Service
Description
What does it do? What does it
cost?
NetDox
(cont.)
use service designed to
assure the security and
confidentiality of
electronically transmitted
“packages” created by the
sender.
Service”, the NetDox
server handles and
assures all transmissions.
NetDox offers a wide
range of security and non-
repudiation services for
documents, images and
video with varying levels
of security.
to 250Kb.  Additional
charges pertain to
larger messages,
message
confirmation, and
longer term record
archiving.
Oracle PRODUCTS
Oracle provides X.509
certification, Kerberos and
other single sign-on
technologies.
Available products
support secure access
through non-Oracle
firewalls and persistent/
non-persistent database
connections behind
firewalls. Security server
CA technology available.
Server hardware and
Oracle software is
required.  Incentive
pricing is mentioned in
response but not
clearly defined.
PenOp PRODUCTS
PenOp is software for the
secure capture,
management and
verification of handwritten
signatures.
PenOp enables users to
perform a normal
autograph and have it
captured electronically.
PenOp can also reliably
capture, store and
transport signatures
between different
systems.  PenOp does
offer signature
verification.
PenOp offers run-time
licenses costing $100
to allow signature
captures on
workstations.  The
digitizer pad and pen
required to perform
the signature cost
around $100.  For
signature verification,
the price goes
according to the
enterprise scale.
PenOp SDK costs
$699 + $20 shipping.
Trusted
Information
Systems
(TIS)
PRODUCTS
TIS offers security
software, including the
Gauntlet Internet Firewall,
the Gauntlet PC Extender
and SmartGATE:
Guaranteed Authenticated
Transaction Environment.
The Gauntlet Internet
Firewall provides secure
access and
communications between
private and public
networks.
The PC Extender creates
a secure virtual private
network (VPN).
SmartGATE provides
secure electronic
commerce for virtually any
TCP/IP application on the
Internet through mutual
authentication and
session encryption and
high-level database
protection.
According to the Product
Cost List provided,
Gauntlet PC Extenders
for both Windows 3.1
and Win95 are $100
each.  All SmartGATE
servers are $6000, and
the Gauntlet Internet
Firewall systems can
cost as high as $17,000.
UNISYS SERVICE
Unisys CoolICE (Internet
Commerce Enabler),  is a
software integration
solution that allows
management of a mixture
of static and dynamic
Internet Web services via a
corporate Intranet or the
public Internet.
CoolICE can manage
Internet documents and
services, build Internet
business services based
on existing applications
and data, provide secure
Web access to
applications on existing
servers, and develop new
Web applications based
on data from multiple
servers and databases.
Unisys reports CoolICE
will integrate with industry
standard payment
techniques
No specific costs
provided.
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Analyzing Security and Authentication Needs
Before agencies can choose among the various vendor offerings, a more basic analysis of
security and authentication needs for individual projects must be undertaken. Basic
judgements about security and authentication must be made by the agency and communicated
to the vendors. In determining whether a given security need exists, agencies should consider
questions like: how is this process implemented today?; does it require a signature?; is there a
statute or regulation that requires privacy or confidentiality or individual identification?; is
this an area where there has been litigation or other disputes in the past – if so, what are the
problems and how do they relate to the online system?; how much financial or other legal
liability exposure is there for the agency if there is a problem with this application?.
The Security and Authentication Requirements Matrix on page 26 summarizes Task Force
discussions defining categories of information security. This matrix provides a draft model for
analyzing security and authentication needs on a project basis.
The left column lists specific characteristics that may be a part of a single online government
application. Across the right columns are security requirements broken into three levels:
Network, Document and Application. To make use of the matrix, an agency would first
determine which characteristics apply to their particular application. Then, reading across the
right, agencies would check off appropriate security requirements for each of the application
characteristics that apply. It is important to note that application characteristics are broken out
to assist agencies in targeting security solutions specifically to the part of the application
where such solutions are required. Security solutions can be costly, time-consuming and
resource intensive and should therefore be matched closely to actual application needs.
For any given application characteristic, there is a checklist of information security
requirements that might apply. These are in three levels: network, document and application.
Some security only deals with the flow or control of data as it flows over a Network
(including the Internet):
¨ Confidentiality means preventing interception and reading of the data as it flows
over the network.
¨ Authentication for access control means only allowing certain users access to
certain areas or resources on a network.
The next level, Document Security, deals with the transactional data itself - the data that
actually constitutes the filing, the bid or the contract, for example. This data may need to be
kept over time, secured, authenticated and so on:
¨ Data privacy refers to data in which a person or entity has a continuing legal
interest or right. Medical records, proprietary information and financial data
would usually require this type of security.
¨ Receipt or acknowledgement refers to those instances where confirmation of
transmission receipt is required for a given document or data set.
¨ Authentication for binding intent refers to data that form the basis of a contract
or other document that is being assented to or “signed”.
¨ Data integrity refers to the need to show that the data originally sent has not
been tampered with during a given period of time.
The last level, Application, involves functionality available within the application:
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¨ Authentication of Role or Authority for Specific Actions refers to an individual
user’s ability to perform any given function within the application such as
approving data or setting user rights.
These categories overlap to some extent, but they are presented as a basis to begin thinking
about information security needs for a given application in a structured and solution-oriented
manner. The following example uses Comm-PASS (the State’s online procurement and
solicitation system) to illustrate how an agency may be able to use the matrix.
A given electronic commerce application may require one or more of the application
characteristics that are listed in the left column of the matrix. CommPASS, for example,
requires #4, Account Usage, for agency updates since only authorized parties may update
their own information. It requires #1, Information Access, for the publishing of publicly
available information. Eventually, for bid submission, that part of the application would entail
#3, Legally-binding Documents. If the system allowed bidder information requests by e-mail
or web form, then that would fall under #2, Information or Service Request.
Given this set of application characteristics, the applicable security requirements are then
identified. For Account Usage (#4), Transmission Confidentiality at the Network level would
probably be necessary. For Information Access (#1) it is likely there would be no security
requirements. For Legally-binding Documents (#3), Transmission Confidentiality would be
needed at the Network level; and Data Privacy, Receipt or Acknowledgement, Authentication
for Binding Intent and Data Integrity would likely be needed at the Document level. Finally,
for Information or Service Request (#2), it is probable that only Receipt or Acknowledgement
at the Document level would be needed.
Based on the boxes checked in the matrix, an agency would then want to match up the
security requirements with an available menu of technical security offerings. Such a menu
would include smart cards, biometrics, Public Key cryptography, signature dynamics and
other technologies offered by vendors (see Technology Matrix above). Based on an analysis
of costs, benefits and risks the choice of technical offerings can be more closely tailored to the
actual application needs. Further refinement of the matrix and the development of a menu of
technology solutions have been recommended as part of this report.
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SECURITY AND AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENTS MATRIX
APPLICATION
CHARACTERISTICS
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Network Level Document Level Application Level
Transmission
Confidentiality
Authentication for
Access Control
Data Privacy Receipt or
Acknowledge-
ment
Authentication
for binding
Intent
Data
Integrity
Authentication of
Role or Authority
for Specific
Actions
1. Information Access (publicly
available, Web page)
2. Information or service
request (requires response
or confirmation)
3. Legally-binding documents
(bids, licenses, applications,
filings, notices, etc.)
4. Account Usage (authorized
use of networked data or
resources)
5. Electronic payment
transactions
Page 27
Appendix A: Online Government Task Force Mission
Online Government Task Force
1. Introduction
The Chief Information Officer has established the Online Government Task Force to
chart the immediate future course of online government in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. The Task Force shall report to the CIO on:
a) the Commonwealth’s operational needs for online government functions;
b) the legal and policy requirements for such functions, with particular emphasis on
the need for authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiability;
c) currently available and near-term technologies performing such functions;
d) central services that could promote the growth of online government;
e) the state of current technical and legal efforts in the Commonwealth, other states,
the federal government, and other countries;
f) specific technical and legal information that could support agencies that are
implementing or evaluating online government functions;
g) suitable candidates for pilot projects for evaluating online government solutions.
2. Operational Needs for Online Government
The Task Force should explicitly identify the Commonwealth’s range of operations
that could be performed better or more efficiently using online technologies. The
Task Force should identify online government projects that are being implemented
now and are planned or desired in the short term by agencies. The Task Force should
identify and categorize the types of government functions that are ripe for networked
automation. The scope should extend to both Internet and Intranet communications.
3. Legal and Policy Requirements for Online Government
The Task Force should identify and categorize the functionality needed for online
government functions to comply with business, legal, and policy requirements.
Specifically, the Task Force should evaluate requirements for authenticity, integrity,
confidentiality, and non-repudiability of network communications, with particular
emphasis on the suitability of PKI technologies.
4. Current Technology
The Task Force should assess the current and near-term state of the technology
available to meet the business, legal, and policy needs of the Commonwealth. This
includes testing or demonstrating relevant technology. This effort should result in a
narrative and/or a matrix that represents a thorough evaluation of current offerings by
PKI and other vendors, as well as an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
these solutions.
5. Central Services for Promoting Online Government
Given the business, legal, and policy requirements, and the technologies available to
meet them, the Task Force should identify key central services, particularly PKI
services, that would promote the use of online technologies by state agencies.
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6. Standards and Guidance for Agencies
The Task Force should develop specific standards and guidance for agencies that
wish to implement online government solutions. The emphasis should be on concrete,
practical advice that can materially assist agencies that have advanced to the point of
implementing an online government operation. In addition to this specific guidance,
the Task Force should also develop information and advice for agencies that wish to
evaluate the benefits of online technologies. This and/or
other material should also serve to give agency management the information they
need to appreciate and support online technologies.
7. Pilot Projects
As a result of identifying business needs, legal and policy requirements, available
technologies, and the appropriate central role for the state, the Task Force should
propose suitable candidates for pilot projects for evaluating online government
solutions.
8. Members of the PKI Task Force
Membership in the task force is open to any public entity in the Commonwealth.
Anyone interested in joining the task force or receiving more information should
contact Dan Greenwood at dgreenwood@state.ma.us or 617.973.0071.
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Appendix B: Agency Project Survey Form and Results
ARGEO PAUL CELLUCCI
GOVERNOR
Telephone:  (617)973-0762
Facsimile:  (617)727-3766
CHARLES D. BAKER
SECRETARY
T. LOUIS GUTIERREZ
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
August 25, 1997
TO: Cabinet Secretaries
Agency Heads
System Directors
I have convened an “Online Government Task Force” to explore and report on current and
recommended uses of electronic commerce technologies and practices for the Commonwealth. I am
especially interested in assisting agencies to use the Internet for state business transactions. Such
initiatives may be as simple as enabling citizens to query public information at your agency over the
Internet, or as bottom-line oriented as setting up secure online filings and payments. The aim is to
deploy public network technologies to reduce costs and enhance service quality to citizens and
businesses that interact with us.
The Task Force is paying particular attention to the legal and technical requirements for information
security. It is important to the statewide planning effort that the appropriate person(s) at your agency
completes the attached survey for each electronic commerce project you may have underway or planned.
Because of our concern that constituents and state business partners not find themselves faced with
incompatible or fragmented technologies as agencies begin to bring their business online, agency
participation in this survey is essential to having executive branch agency initiatives endorsed and
supported in the statewide online government plan.
The Information Technology Division will be allocating some of its MAGNet information technology
investment funds in FY98 to assist selected agencies in implementing projects identified through this
survey, in the form of matching funds.
Your staff may submit the attached survey, or complete the survey online at
http://www.state.ma.us/itd/ogtf.htm. If you have any questions about the survey or the Task Force,
please contact Dan Greenwood by telephone at (617) 973-0071 or by sending e-mail to
Dan.Greenwood@state.ma.us.
Thank you very much for your assistance with this exciting and important endeavor.
Sincerely,
T. Louis Gutierrez,
Chief Information Officer
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Office for Administration and Finance
Information Technology Division
One Ashburton Place   ·  Room  801   ·   Boston   ·   Massachusetts  ·  02108
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Online Government Task Force Project Survey
Agency: ___________________________________________________________________
Name of project:_____________________________________________________________
Brief description: ____________________________________________________________
Contact name: ________ telephone: _______________  e-mail: _____________________
1.  This project will be based on:
m an existing (or "legacy") system with few or no changes
      or m a replacement for an existing system
      or m a completely new system
2.  Users will be accessing the system (sel ct all that apply) :
o from within the state/agency network (MAGNet)
o from within a state network external to MAGNet
o from the Internet
3.  Users of this system are:
m not known in advance
      or m of a known community (select all that apply):
o state field workers
o state regional offices
o contracted providers
o regulated businesses or professionals
o Massachusetts local governments
o other governments (federal, other states, etc.)
      or m pre-identified through some other process- lease describe:
_______________________________________________________________________
4.  Users will be able to (select all that apply):
o query (search) a database
o update a database (submit information)
o pay fees- required
o pay fees- optional
o other- please describe: _____________________________________________
5.  Verifying the identity of the user ("authentication") is:
m not required.
      or m required, with a ohigh, omedium, or low degree of certainty.
How is identity established in your current system?
_______________________________________________________________________
6.  Will statutory or regulatory changes be needed for this project? oyes    ono
7. m Communications do not need to be secured.
      or m Communications need to be secured:
o to ensure privacy or confidentiality
o for non-repudiation (proof that a particular person sent particular data)
o for access control (authenticate users and what they can do)
8.  At what stage is this project:
m being conceptualized
      or m concept accepted, being designed or planned
      or m funding and resources identified/committed
      or m work is being done!
This survey can be completed online at http://www.state.ma.us/itd/ogtf.htm, or send paper to: Dan
Greenwood, Information Technology Division, rm. 801, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA, 02108
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AGENCY PROJECT SURVEY RESULTS
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Bureau of Special Investigations:
Investigator's System
No No Yes State field workers; state regional
offices. Known internal party
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Work being
done
Campaign and Political Finance:
OCPF Website
No Yes Yes Regulated businesses or
professionals; Mass. Local govt's;
other govt's. Known external party
Yes No No No No Concept
Committee For Public Counsel
Services ( CPC ):
PC BILL
No Yes No Contracted providers. Known
external party
Download
software
Yes No No Yes Work being
done
Department of Correction:
Inmate Research Statistics project
No No Yes State field workers; regulated
businesses or professionals;
Mass. Local govts.; other govts.
Known internal and external
parties
Yes No No Yes No Concept
Department of Housing and
Community Development:
Client and Fiscal Management System
(CAFMIS)- IT2
No Yes Yes State field workers; state regional
offices; contracted providers;
LHAs; Municipalities. Known
internal and external parties
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Work being
done
Department of Revenue:
Tax Exempt/Resale Certificate
Verification
No Yes Yes Regulated businesses or
professionals. Known external
party
Yes Validity
certification
Yes Yes Yes Yes Concept
Department of Revenue:
Corporate/Personal Income Tax
Extensions
Yes Yes No Regulated businesses or
professionals. Known external
party
Yes Submit
extensions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Concept
Department of Revenue:
Customer Feedback Form
No Yes No Regulated businesses or
professionals
Submit info No Yes Yes Yes Concept
Department of Revenue:
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT)
Application
Yes Yes No Regulated businesses or
professionals. Known external
party
Yes Submit EFT
application
Yes Yes Yes Yes Concept
Department of Revenue:
Taxpayer Change of Address Form
Yes Yes Yes Registered tax-payers. Known
external party
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Concept
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Division of Banks:
Authenticated Internet Forms Filing
No Yes No Pilot Banks. Known external partyYes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes work being
done
EOHHS:
Client Index
No No Yes Management personnel in
executive office and possibly
agencies. Known internal party
Yes Yes Yes No No Work being
done
Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs:
Internet Access to GIS
Yes Yes Yes Possibly restrict use to liscensed
site professionals. Known
external party
Yes Call up
predefined map
No No No No Work being
done
Executive Office of Public Safety:
Public Safety's Non-Confidential
Information
No Yes Yes General public. Unknown external
party
Yes No No No No Design
Fisheries, Wildlife and
Environmental Law Enforcement:
SPORT
No Yes No State regional offices; regulated
businesses or professionals;
Licensees and License Agents.
Known internal and external
parties
Yes Yes Yes Obtain licenses,
permits,
registrations, etc.
No Yes No Yes Design
General Court:
Massachusetts General Laws Online
No Yes No General public, Public agencies.
Unknown external party
No No No No No No No Work being
done
Holyoke Community College:
Student registration over the Web
Yes Yes No General public. Unknown external
party
Yes Register for
classes
No Yes No Yes Design
Holyoke Community College:
Student access to personal information
Yes Yes No Registered students. Known
external party
Yes Yes Yes No No Work being
done
Mass Highway:
Incident Management
No Yes Yes State field workers; state regional
offices; Mass. Local gov't;
emergency services. Known
internal and external parties
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Concept
Mass Highway:
Federal Highway Electronic Data
Exchange
No Yes Yes State field workers; state regional
offices; Mass. Local govt's; other
govt's. Known internal and
external parties
Yes Yes Authorize
funding
Yes No Yes Yes Work being
done
Mass Highway:
Traffic Video Information
No Yes Yes General public Yes No No No No Concept
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Mass Highway:
Graphical Information Systems
Interface Map
No Yes Yes State field workers; state regional
offices; other govt's. Known
internal and external parties
Yes Download state
maps
No No No No Concept
Massachusetts Aeronautics
Commission (MAC):
Airport Information Management
System (AIMS)
No Yes Yes State field workers; regulated
businesses or professionals;
Mass. Local govts.; other govts.;
Airport managers, etc.; general
public. Known internal and
external parties and unknown
external parties
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Design
Mount Wachusett Community
College:
Distance Learning
No Yes No Students and faculty. Known
internal party
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Design
North Shore Community College:
EDE
No No No State regional offices. Known
internal party
Yes Yes Interface with
database
Yes No No Yes Work being
done
North Shore Community College:
State SQL server for spending plan
Yes No No Spending plan users. Known
internal party
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Work being
done
North Shore Community College:
Banner Web for Student
Yes Yes No Students with ID. Known internal
party
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Design
Office of the Comptroller:
MMARSWeb/ManagerMMars
Yes No Yes Department managers. Known
internal party
Yes No No Pre-designed
queries and
reports
No No No Yes Concept
Office of the Comptroller:
MMARSWeb/VendorWeb
Yes Yes No Commonwealth vendors. Known
external party
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Concept
Office of the Comptroller:
MARSWeb/WEBWarehouse
Yes Yes Yes State employees, vendors,
citizens, press. Unknown external
party
Yes No No 7 x 24 availabilityNo No No No Concept
Operational Services Division:
Procurement Desktop
No No Yes Department staff; vendors. Known
internal and external parties
Yes Yes Yes Order and
payment
process; updates
MMARS
Yes Yes Yes Yes Concept
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Operational Services Division:
Comm-Pass
No Yes Yes All Prospective Bidders; public
agencies, general public.
Unknown external party
Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Work being
done
Registry of Motor Vehicles:
Express Lane
Yes Yes No General public. Unknown external
party
No Yes Yes Issues a
confirmation of
your order.
Yes Yes No No Work being
done
Secretary of State:
Voter Information
Yes Yes No General public. Unknown external
party
Yes No No No No Concept
Worcester State College:
Colleague INTERNET  Access
Yes Yes No General public. Unknown external
party
Yes Yes No No No No Design
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Appendix C: Request for Information
Request for Information
Secure Online Transactions
Thursday, April 24, 1997
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting through the online Government Task
Force, is contemplating the release of one or more procurements for electronic
commerce products and/or services. This Request for Information (RFI) is intended
to solicit information that could be useful in drafting subsequent RFRs. This RFI
specifically seeks information on products and/or services that will enable the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to use the Internet and internal networks for secure
messaging and transactions.
Section 1: Background
The Chief Information Officer for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
convened the Online Government Task Force to chart the immediate future course of
online government in Massachusetts. The Task Force consists of representatives from
a number of different agencies, departments and offices of the Commonwealth. The
Task Force is investigating solutions that improve efficiency and service quality
using internal and Internet-based electronic communications that possess
authentication (to achieve access control as well as non-repudiation), integrity, and
confidentiality.
The Commonwealth has made information technology (IT) development and
electronic communications a priority, spending approximately $350 million on IT
annually. The Commonwealth seeks to make a large number of routine business
transactions available over the Internet and internal networks, with the intent that
they will be performed for less cost and conducted at a higher quality service level
for citizens, regulated entities, vendors and others. The Commonwealth seeks to
create methods for secure access to a number of business transactions via electronic
media, including licensing, permitting, applications, filings, procurement and a host
of other functions. Internally, the Intranet is being looked at as a potential mechanism
to alleviate the crush of paper associated with a large number of routine state
government functions, including personnel, procurement drafting, and other
collaborative data sharing, work flow or messaging applications.
Today, the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) processes a number of transactions
and accepts credit card payment over the state web site. The RMV transactions assure
the confidentiality of credit card data over the Internet by use of public key
cryptography implemented with the SSL 2 protocol. The Division of Banks (DOB)
has embarked on a pilot project to receive authenticated online filings by banks over
the state web site. The DOB pilot assures the data is confidential and the identity of
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the filing bank and individual filer is authenticated by use of public key cryptography
implemented with the SSL 3 protocol. The banks participating in the DOB pilot are
issued standard X.509v3 digital certificates associated with the bank public key.
While the Task Force is interested in all relevant replies to this request for
information, responses that propose cost effective and currently available methods to
assure non-repudiation are of particular interest. Non-repudiation means a method to
prevent or sufficiently rebut subsequent denial of transmittal or receipt of a given
message or participation in a given transaction. In some cases, this non-repudiation
must be capable of tying an individual to a particular piece or set of data at a
particular time. For non-repudiation, mere access control based on an SSL 3
implementation of public key cryptography and digital certificates will not suffice,
unless some additional technique exists to bind the identity of a given party to the
message or transaction engaged in by that party.
Section 2: Purpose of RFI
The Task Force seeks responses from vendors which offer information about
currently- available solutions to any or all of the following business needs and
example applications:
2.1 Internet access with Authentication.
Such an application would involve access via the Internet to Commonwealth data
located behind the firewall.
Example:
Certain companies, for a legitimate business purpose, need to know the driving
records of certain employees. A solution is needed that will allow a pre-selected
group of companies to access employee driver histories and determine driver status
from a state database. Access control is required to allow companies to access only
the driving records of their employees.
General Considerations:
Authentication, in the example above, is being utilized to assure access control to
defined data on the network. Assuming the data is being viewed with a web browser,
then some provision may also be required to assure the data remains confidential and
has not been altered while in transit over the Internet.
2.2 Internet-based data submission with non-persistent connection.
Such an application would involve access via the Internet to a Commonwealth
database behind the firewall for the purpose of submitting information.
Example 1:
For the purpose of posting requests for response as part of a procurement, certain
users would be allowed access to a state procurement services database, provided
authentication and non-repudiation is available for each submission.
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Example 2:
For the purpose of applying for a professional or commercial license renewal, certain
users would be allowed access to a state license database, where the application form
would be electronically delivered. As in the previous example, non-repudiation is
required to prevent the applicant from denying information submitted in the
application and to provide proof that the state received a particular application.
General Considerations:
The posting of bids in response to a procurement and the submission of a license
application raise a number of issues that are unique to those processes. The
Commonwealth will be performing a number of other transactions as well, including
grant applications, online permitting and various filings with state agencies. The
Commonwealth will pursue some transactions under this category (Internet-based
data submission with non-persistent connection) that will not require non-
repudiation. Some of these transactions would require only front-end authentication
for access control, other transactions would not require authentication of the identity
of the person submitting data for either access control or non-repudiation. However,
the Task Force is particularly interested in information relating to non-repudiation.
2.3 Internet-based data exchange with persistent connection.
Such an application would involve access via the Internet to an online application
located behind the firewall such that the user would be authenticated once, and the
system would maintain the identity of the user in all portions of the application
throughout the duration of the session.
Example:
For the purpose of negotiating and crafting contract agreements, both state users and
non-governmental users would be allowed access to a common document
management and electronic workflow application, with all users considered
“members” of the workflow and able to perform tasks in the workflow. The
application front-end allows users to submit documents, edit documents and query
databases behind the firewall.
Section 3: Environment
The following diagram describes the Commonwealth’s current and near-term
computing and communications environment. See Attachment 1.
Section 4: Other Considerations
Interested vendors may provide information regarding products, services and/or
integrated solutions that address either some or all of the above-mentioned business
needs. The purpose of this RFI is to provide the Commonwealth with information
that could be useful in developing one or more RFRs for secure online transactions
and messaging. Please feel free to respond to any specific questions in this RFI or to
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offer any other information that you feel could be useful to the Commonwealth in
making decisions about an RFR. In addition to the questions raised in the previous
sections, the Commonwealth is interested in information on the following.
4.1 Identify and describe all software or hardware required on a client workstation for the
proposed product/service/solution.
4.2 Identify and describe any back-end software or hardware required of the proposed
product/service/solution.
4.3Describe how your product/service/solution scales to the enterprise.
4.4 What are the short, mid and long term electronic records archival ramifications of the
proposed product/service/solution, including suitability for audit and admissibility in
evidence in a court?
4.5 How is the product/service/solution compliant with the provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act?
4.6How is the product/service/solution Year 2000 compliant?
4.7 What, if any, privacy concerns are raised by the authentication techniques proposed and how
are those concerns addressed?
4.8 Does the proposed product/service/solution offer any online payment capabilities? Please
describe.
4.9 Describe any current implementations of your product/service/solution and note any
business partners involved with that implementation.
4.10 Provide information about your company and its history.
4.11 Provide cost information about the proposed product/service/solution.
Section 5: Procedural Information
This RFI is not an offer or solicitation and does not obligate or bind the
Commonwealth to procure any goods or services as a consequence. Responses to this
RFI do not constitute bids or proposals and are not legally binding on the responding
party. Respondents may not charge ITD or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for
any costs associated with the preparation of responses to this RFI. This RFI is being
released on Commonwealth’s Procurement Access and Solicitation System (Comm-
PASS). A copy of this RFI is also available at ITD’s legal department web site at
<http://www.state.ma.us/itd/legal>. The schedule of events for this RFI, subject to
amendment, is:
Thursday, April 24, 1997 RFI released on Comm-PASS
Friday, May 2, 1997 Informational session
Monday, May 12, 1997Responses due
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The informational session will be held at One Ashburton Place, Room 801, Boston,
MA 02108 from 10:00 am to 11:00 am. Please inform the chairman of the
procurement management team (preferably by e-mail) if you will attend the session
so that adequate seating can be made available. Organizations or individuals
responding to this RFI should submit ten copies of their response in writing,
accompanied by any attachments, exhibits or software, to the chairman of the
procurement management team by 5:00 pm on Monday, May 12, 1997. Responses
must also be submitted via e-mail or on floppy disk in Word for Windows,
WordPerfect format, or as a Text-Only document. The chairman of the procurement
management team is:
<dgreenwood@state.ma.us>
Dan Greenwood, Deputy General Counsel, Information Technology Division
Online Government Task Force, Team Leader
One Ashburton Place, Room 801
Boston, MA 02108
617.973.0071
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Appendix D: Electronic Authentication Primer
PKI and Other Authentication Technology
There are many ways to create an electronic signature. These can range from simple methods,
such as typing a name at the bottom of an e-mail message, to more complex and secure
methods involving biometric technologies, such as fingerprint or retinal scans. Other types of
authentication methods that are used to create electronic signatures include the use of
magnetic stripe cards and PIN numbers, user names and passwords, public key cryptography,
writing tablets with electronic pens, or even smart cards that generate a unique access code
every few seconds. As technology advances, the list of viable alternatives is certain to grow.
Because there are so many ways to create an electronic signature, and because many of them
do not resemble a holographic “autograph,” many law reform efforts have adopted the term
“authentication” rather than “signature.” For example, the current drafts of Uniform
Commercial Code Articles 2 and 2B eliminate the term “sign” and instead allow the
authenticity of documents to be proven in any reasonable manner.1 These drafts also clarify
that assent may be manifested through any form of authentication, including proof of the
authentication process itself.2
One of the most interesting and robust technologies being used and developed for
authentication purposes is known as public key cryptography, which allows for a very high
degree of reliability when implemented properly. A “digital signature” does not refer to the
image of a signature in any way. Unlike an “electronic signature” which is simply any symbol
or process intended to be a signature and a “digitized signature” which refers to an electronic
image of a signature, a “digital signature” is actually a term of art that refers to the scrambling
of data in order to provide security and authentication. While the technical details of public
key cryptography are extremely complex and have limited utility to a broader audience, an
understanding of the basic concepts is both accessible and useful. Due to the current interest
in deploying large-scale public key systems, it is likely that this technology will touch many
areas of the economy. In fact, the growth of public key systems in many sectors of the
economy suggests that a rudimentary knowledge of these concepts will serve lawyers well
when legal questions arise as a result of this technology.
The Basics of Public Key Cryptography
Codes and cryptography are thousands of years old. Although cryptography became much
more sophisticated in modern times, it still relied on both the sender and the receiver knowing
the same “secret key” to encode and then decode messages. To be secure, a secret key coding
                                                 
1 According to the UCC March 21, 1997 Draft 2B-102(a)(2) and the UCC May 16, 1997 Draft 2-
102(a)(1) “’Authenticate’ means to sign or to execute or adopt a symbol, including a digital signal and
identifier, or to do an act that to encrypt a record or an electronic message in whole or in part, with
present intent to adopt, establish the authenticity of, or signify a party's acceptance and adoption of, a
record or term that contains the authentication or to which a record containing the authentication refers.”
Under Reporter’s Note 2 of the same section it is explained that “This article replaces the traditional idea
of "signature" or "signed " with a term that incorporates modern electronic systems, including all forms
of encryption or digital symbol systems. Substantive rules on proof of authentication are in Section 2B-
[114]. Basically, the fact of authentication can be proved in any manner including proof of a process that
necessarily resulted in authentication. Use of an "attribution procedure" agreed to by the parties per se
establishes that a symbol or act constitutes an authentication.”
2 See UCC March 21, 1997 Draft 2B-112, 2B-114(b): “A record or message is authenticated as a matter
of law if the symbol executed or adopted by a party complies with an attribution procedure for
authentication agreed to or adopted by the parties. Otherwise, authentication may be proven in any
manner, including by showing that a procedure existed by which a party necessarily must have executed
or adopted a symbol in order to proceed further in the use or processing of the information.”
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system requires some method for distributing the secret key to intended users without it
falling into the hands of other parties.
The basic nature of the Internet makes it poorly suited for a secret key system because it is an
“open” network in which messages may make several “stops” before arriving at their final
destination. This creates a serious risk that a third party could intercept a secret key at some
point along its routing, which would allow him to read encoded messages or even send coded
messages purporting to be from an authorized holder of the secret key. Physically delivering a
secret key to every user by secure channels would be slow, expensive, unwieldy, and would
effectively rule out serendipitous or one-time transactions between people and firms that have
not previously exchanged secret keys.
Public key cryptography eliminates the need for users to share a secret key, which makes it
ideally suited for communications over “open” networks such as the Internet. While the
following illustration describes a complex process, the hardware and software that
implements this technology will shield the end user from these details; end users will find no
need to concern themselves with the complicated background operations that make the system
possible.
With a public key system, each user will have software that will generate two related keys
known as the public key and the private key. The fundamental characteristic of these key pairs
is that the public key, and only that public key, can decrypt a message encrypted with its
corresponding private key. Similarly, the private key, and only that private key, can decrypt a
message encrypted with its corresponding public key. As such, these key pairs are analogous
to secret decoder rings from a box of cereal, where each ring fits into its companion ring and
no other.3
Once Bob, a user, has generated his public/private key pair with a computer, he keeps his
private key very secure (protected by a password on his computer or, preferably, a smart card
locked in a safe) but he makes his public key freely available by sending it to people or by
posting it to a public key directory on the Internet. Then, if Alice, another user, wants to send
Bob a private message she can obtain Bob’s public key and use it to encrypt the message.
Since only Bob’s private key can decrypt a message that has been encrypted with his public
key, both Alice and Bob can be sure that only Bob can read the message. Thus, public key
cryptography allows two people to send secure messages without the need to exchange a
secret key through a secure channel. Only Bob’s public key needs to be shared in order for
Bob to receive completely secure messages.
This unique characteristic of public key cryptography also forms the basis for secure digital
signatures. This process is illustrated in the diagram below. In order to generate a digital
signature, Bob must first have a message (1) that he wants to sign and send to Alice. The
message could be as simple as an e-mail message or as complicated as a lengthy contract. Bob
would then run his communication to Alice through one of several standard algorithms known
as hash functions (2) that performs a series of mathematical operations on the original
message. The hash function produces a number called a message digest (3), which can be
thought of as a fingerprint of the message, because any change in the message, no matter how
slight, will cause the hash function to produce a completely different message digest. Bob
then encrypts the message digest with his private key (4). The message digest encrypted with
                                                 
3 The math underlying public key cryptography is rather esoteric and is beyond the scope of this paper.
In short, public key cryptography is based on the fact that the only way to factor a large prime product (a
very large number derived by multiplying two large prime numbers) is by having a computer calculate
every possible combination of numbers in order to find the two component numbers. If the component
numbers are large enough, solving the equation becomes “computationally intractable.” The current
generation of public key cryptosystems uses numbers so large that it would take extremely powerful
computers years, and millions of dollars, to crack a single public/private key pair.
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Bob’s private key forms the actual digital signature for the message.4 Finally, Bob transmits
both the digital signature and his original message to Alice (5). If Bob also wants to keep his
message to Alice confidential, he could encrypt the message using Alice’s public key (not
shown).
Sent to Alice
 Buy 500 shares of
 Acme
Bob's Message Hash Function
95774223551719
Message Digest Digital SignatureBob's Private Key
sl3k9dj5y76djf9xk4s
   Buy 500 shares of
 Acme
Message
The message itself may or may not be encrypted for confidentiality.  In this example it is not.
1 5432
Upon receipt, Alice’s computer and software would perform two separate operations to verify
Bob’s identity and to determine if the message had been altered in transit. As a practical
matter it is not important which operation is performed first.5 To veri y Bob’s identity, Alice’s
system would take Bob’s digital signature (1) and then use Bob’s public key (2) to decrypt the
digital signature, which will produce the message digest (3). If this operation is successful,
Alice knows for a fact that Bob, who alone has access to his private key, must have sent the
message.
In order to ensure that Bob’s message had not been altered in transit, Alice would run Bob’s
message (4) through the same hash function (5) that Bob used, which would yield a message
digest of Bob’s message (6). Alice would then compare the two-message digests (7), and if
they were the same she would know for a fact that the message had not been altered in transit.
                                                 
4 The digital signature is created through two distinct steps: First, the message digest, created through
the use of a hash function, ensures the integrity of the content of the intended communication. Second,
the use of the private key to encrypt the message digest authenticates the identity of the person sending
the message.
5 The two operations are performed upon separate documents. One upon the digital signature, an
encrypted message digest, and the other upon the message itself. Although the results of both operations
are compared against each other to obtain a true verification, it is irrelevant which operation is
performed first.
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From Bob
Hash Function
 95774223551719
Message Digest
Digital Signature Public Key
sl3k9dj5y76djf9xk4s
Buy 500 shares of
Acme
Message
 95774223551719
Compare
Results
Message Digest
1
7
32
654
Thus, public key cryptography allows people and businesses to exchange messages over open
networks with a high degree of confidence that those messages are confidential (unable to be
read by unauthorized persons), authentic (sender’s identity can be verified), and accurate (the
message can not be altered without detection). This is a level of security far greater than that
afforded by ink signatures. This technology can enable the use of online systems to send and
receive tax returns, purchase orders, mortgage applications, credit card orders, and any other
type of sensitive or official information with greater security than if the transactions were
conducted on paper.
However, nothing said so far would rule out the possibility that an impostor could generate a
public/private key pair and then post the public key on the Internet claiming it belongs to Bob.
Unaware of the deception, Alice might then use this public key to send messages that the
impostor, but not Bob, could read. The impostor could also use the fake private key to
digitally sign messages that Alice would assume Bob sent because they can be decoded using
the public key which Alice does not yet realize is fraudulent. In order to prevent this, parties
relying on digital signatures must have confidence that the public key on the Internet that
purports to belong to Bob is, in fact, owned by him. This function is performed by a trusted
third party known as a certification authority (CA), which binds the identity of a particular
party to a particular public key and, by implication, a particular private key.
CAs do this by issuing a digital certificate.  A digital certificate is a small electronic record
that (i) identifies the CA issuing it, (ii) identifies the subscriber, (iii) contains the subscriber's
public key, and (iv) is digitally signed with the CA’s private key. The digital certificate can
also contain additional information, including a reliance limit or a reference to the CA’s
“certification practice statement” that gives relying parties notice of the level of inquiry
conducted by the CA before issuing the certificate.
To obtain a digital certificate, Bob would present the CA with a copy of his public key along
with sufficient proof of his identity. For digital certificates that could be used for larger
transactions, the CA might charge a higher fee and require greater proof of identity. Once
satisfied as to the identity of the subscriber, the CA would issue the subscriber a digital
certificate. When Bob wants to use his digital signature, he would also transmit a copy of his
digital certificate to Alice. In addition to the steps described above, upon receipt of Bob’s
message Alice’s computer would also confirm with the CA identified in the digital certificate
that Bob is who he purports to be and that his certificate has not expired or been revoked. If
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Bob learns or fears that his private key has been compromised, he would notify his CA of this
fact so that it could post that information to its “certificate revocation list.” All of this activity
would take place in the background, unseen and unnoticed by Alice, and would happen in
much the same way as it occurs with online credit card validation systems.
One of the major unanswered questions about the use of public key cryptography for digital
signatures, and a major point of contention between advocates of different types of electronic
signature laws, relates to the business model for CA services that will ultimately prevail in the
marketplace. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) will need to evolve to support use of this
technology6. While advances in technology will certainly create new possibilities not
presently contemplated, the two primary business models currently vying for support are
known as the “open PKI” and “closed PKI” models.
An open PKI model assumes that subscribers will obtain a digital certificate from a CA that
will securely link their identity to their public key for all, or at least many, purposes. Thus, in
an open PKI environment a person could obtain a digital certificate and then use it to order
goods online from various merchants, sign legally binding agreements, or even file documents
with a government entity. Subscribers could use their certificate for any transaction requiring
a digital signature. In the closed PKI model, users would obtain a different digital certificate
for each community of interests with which they interact online. For example, a user could
have one certificate for transactions with their bank, a different certificate for communications
with their employer, and yet another certificate for dealings with their health care provider.
The difference between the two models is significant. Under an open PKI model, a person’s
certificate could potentially be used to sign any document, which makes the consequences
extremely severe if the user’s private key is compromised. In a closed PKI, on the other hand,
the risks to the user and the CA from an improperly signed document are more limited due to
the system’s more narrowly defined scope. Furthermore, the members of a particular
community within a closed PKI system may enter into agreements that define the rights and
responsibilities of the members, which would further reduce the risks and uncertainty in such
a system.
Emerging PKI Standards
Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) is an online payment standard for credit cards. It
involves the use of X.509 certificates. This standard is not widely used at this time. Other
payment methods include the Cybercash method, E-Check and Millicent.
The Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) standard allows e-mail to be
digitally signed and sent with an associated public key certificate. S/MIME not comes
standard with Netscape Communicator. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) comes in two varieties:
version 2 and version 3. Version 2 enables point to point encryption between a browser and a
server. This accomplishes message confidentiality while the data is in transit over the Internet.
Version 3 also allows for the exchange of certificates between the browser and server and
permits authentication based on the information contained in those certificates. SSL2 is
widely used and SSL3 is becoming more popular. Secure Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
(S/HTTP) is an http level hashed, secured and sent with the respective public key certificate.
This allows for any data that flows between a browser and a web server to be authenticated
and confidential. There are many other relevant standards, but these are the ones the
Commonwealth has dealt with more frequently.
                                                 
6 The acronym PKI stands for Public Key Infrastructure, reflecting the fact that the use of digital
signatures based on public key cryptography requires an elaborate infrastructure (technical, business,
policy, and legal) to support their use.
Page 45
Non-PKI Technology: The Importance of Maintaining Options
As mentioned earlier, a number of other technologies exist to achieve electronic
authentication. One very important technology is known as Signature Dynamics. It is a
mechanism for the secure capture, management and verification of handwritten signatures by
electronic means.
PenOp was the only company to reply to the Task Force Request for Information to the
vendor community that implements Signature Dynamics. PenOp captures signatures simply
and reliably, and enables them to be securely stored and safely transported between different
systems. For evidential purposes, PenOp signatures can verify the authenticity of the
transaction on which they were signed; PenOp can also verify the authenticity of the signature
on the document with an accuracy and speed unparalleled in the paper domain. In so doing,
PenOp satisfies regulatory and legal requirements for handwritten signatures.
For the signatory, PenOp’s major attraction is the familiarity of submitting their normal
handwritten signature - using a pen. For corporate users, the main benefit is that they can
complete business processes electronically, achieving major cost savings by reducing the need
for paper. It is also worth noting that PenOp removes the need for passwords and PINs,
public/private key pairs or certificates.
The California Digital Signature Regulations address Signature Dynamics as follows:
California Administrative Code Title 2. CHAPTER 10.
 Section 22003(b) List of Acceptable Technologies
The technology known as "Signature Dynamics" is an acceptable technology for use by public
entities in California, provided that the signature is created consistent with the provisions in
Section 22003(b)(1)-(5).
1.Definitions – For the purposes of Section 22003(b), and unless the context expressly
indicates otherwise:
         A."Handwriting Measurements" means the metrics of the shapes, speeds and/or other
distinguishing features of a signature as the person writes it by hand with a pen or stylus on a
flat surface.
         B."Signature Digest" is the resulting bit-string produced when a signature is tied to a
document using Signature Dynamics.
         C."Expert" means a person with demonstrable skill and knowledge based on training
and experience who would qualify as an expert pursuant to California Evidence Code §720.
         D."Signature Dynamics" means measuring the way a person writes his or her signature
by hand on a flat surface and binding the measurements to a message through the use of
cryptographic techniques.
2.California Government Code §16.5 requires that a digital signature be ‘unique to the person
using it.’ A signature digest produced by Signature Dynamics technology may be considered
unique to the person using it, if:
         A.The signature digest records the handwriting measurements of the person signing the
document using signature dynamics technology, and
         B.the signature digest is cryptographically bound to the handwriting measurements, and
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         C.after the signature digest has been bound to the handwriting measurements, it is
computationally infeasible to separate the handwriting measurements and bind them to a
different signature digest.
3.California Government Code §16.5 requires that a digital signature be capable of
verification. A signature digest produced by signature dynamics technology is capable of
verification if:
         A.the acceptor of the digitally signed message obtains the handwriting measurements for
purposes of comparison, and
         B.if signature verification is a required component of a transaction with a public entity,
the handwriting measurements can allow an expert handwriting and document examiner to
assess the authenticity of a signature.
4.California Government Code §16.5 requires that a digital signature remain ‘under the sole
control of the person using it’. A signature digest is under the sole control of the person using
it if:
         A.the signature digest captures the handwriting measurements and cryptographically
binds them to the message directed by the signer and to no other message, and
         B.the signature digest makes it computationally infeasible for the handwriting
measurements to be bound to any other message.
5.The signature digest produced by signature dynamics technology must be linked to the
message in such a way that if the data in the message are changed, the signature digest is
invalidated.
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Appendix E: ADA and Privacy Policy Discussions
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
State Agency Web sites MUST be accessible to users with non-graphical browsers. The
following excerpts are from a U.S. Department of Justice technical assistance letter. The full
letter can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/tal712.txt.
¨ "The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires State and local
governments and places of public accommodation to furnish appropriate
auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication
with individuals with disabilities."
¨ "Covered entities that use the Internet for communications regarding their
programs, goods, or services must be prepared to offer those communications
through accessible means as well."
¨ "Instead of providing full accessibility through the Internet directly, covered
entities may also offer other alternate accessible formats, such as Braille, large
print, and/or audio materials, to communicate the information contained in web
pages to people with visual impairments. The availability of such materials
should be noted in a text (i.e., screen-readable) format on the web page, along
with instructions for obtaining the materials, so that people with disabilities
using the Internet will know how to obtain the accessible formats."
In brief, there are three major areas that may cause an agency web site to be non-compliant:
1. Web sites that use frames that do not have fully equivalent access methods for browsers
that do not support frames. (Text-based browsers cannot support frames, which are based
on the concept of having different windows.)
2. Web sites that post information in PDF format without providing online access to text
equivalents or detailed information on how to obtain Braille or audio versions. Adobe has
set up a service (http://access.adobe.com/) that converts PDF to HTML either on the fly
or as an e-mail service. Unfortunately, it has been frequently unavailable during normal
business hours in the past few weeks. If this is a temporary phenomenon, including
information on using this service may meet a Department’s ADA compliance
requirements.
3. Use of images without specifying alternate text or, in the case of image maps, alternate
navigation methods.
Sarah Bourne, Task Force Member and Director of the Commonwealth’s Internet Services
Group, has put together a web page with links to web sites that can help agencies test their
pages for compliance. Information on designing for accessibility and general information on
the Americans with Disabilities Act is also available at this site. The page can be found at
http://www.state.ma.us/webmass/ada.htm.
Privacy
There is an inherent tension between the individual’s right to privacy and the government’s
need for personal information, the dimensions of which conflict have evolved over time in
response to changes in technology and government’s role in society. The relatively recent
deployment of sophisticated information technology tools in the service of the pervasive
modern state has raised a host of unique variations on this historic theme. The following
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discussion seeks to provide context for thinking about the privacy issues that confront the
Commonwealth, a description and assessment of our current policies, and some suggestions
for improvements.
Context
Massachusetts state government is a massive service delivery organization with huge
information and transaction processing operations. In conducting these operations, the state
gathers, uses, and disseminates vast amounts of information, much of which relates to
specific, identifiable individuals. The widespread use of information technology means that
this information can be permanently stored, rapidly analyzed and extracted, cross matched
with other digital records, copied perfectly an unlimited number of times, and transmitted
almost instantly. This digital revolution has caused a qualitative change in the nature and
character of government records, as well as a quantitative change in the amounts of
information the government collects and stores.
Starting in the early 1970s, first the federal government and then the states responded to the
introduction of mainframe information systems by enacted privacy statutes that attempted to
strike an appropriate balance between government’s need for information, the importance of
open public access to government information, and the protection of personal privacy. Since
then, the PC revolution that started in the early 1980s, and the networking revolution of the
1990s, have significantly altered the technical base upon which this balance was struck. These
new technologies make it increasingly possible to construct virtual dossiers on people
composed of information about their every interaction with any government agency. Even
innocuous personal information can become a constituent piece in a much more invasive
compilation of data. The impact of these changes on what is ultimately a core libertarian value
requires a fresh assessment of the government’s privacy policies.
One of the problems for policy makers in coming to grips with privacy issues is that the
subject seems to crop up in an incredible variety of contexts. Part of this confusion can be
eliminated by realizing that “the right to privacy,” as it is currently understood, has three
fairly distinct branches:
¨ Search and Seizure Privacy. The oldest and most explicit right to privacy is the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This
provision applies only to government action and generally only in criminal or
regulatory matters. Search and seizure privacy arises in the context of house
searches, electronic surveillance, drug tests, drunk driving roadblocks, and the
like.
¨ Decisional Privacy. First articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1960s and
1970s, and subsequently found in the Massachusetts constitution by the SJC,
this is the constitutional right to be free from unwarranted government
interference when making certain fundamental personal decisions. Decisional
privacy arises primarily in contraception, abortion, “right to die,” and sexual
orientation cases.
¨ Informational Privacy. Originally a common law tort doctrine, until privacy
statutes came along in the 1970s, informational privacy concerns the
individual’s right to control, or at least influence, the terms under which
personal information is shared with others. The cluster of rights falling under the
heading of informational privacy all flow from the belief that the inherent
dignity and worth of individuals dictates that they have a central say in how they
choose to present information about themselves to the world.
Page 49
Information technology has had an impact on each of these three areas. Ultimately, however,
its greatest impact is in on informational privacy, and it is this particular dimension of “the
right to privacy” that is the focus of this memo. Government’s policies on informational
privacy affect not only taxpayers, beneficiaries, and customers (broadly speaking), but also its
vendors and employees. In addition to rules for its own information, the government can
choose to, or refuse to, regulate the information practices of private sector entities (both profit
and nonprofit).
In evaluating the Commonwealth’s performance in this regard, it is worth remembering three
things. First, concerns about informational privacy are widespread, with recent surveys
showing that 80% of people are concerned about threats to personal privacy, and that a
majority believes existing laws are inadequate and need to be tightened. Second, privacy is a
subjective concept: 25% of the population favors sharp restrictions on the use of personal
information, another 18% are mostly unconcerned with privacy issues, and 57% are privacy
pragmatists that care about privacy but acknowledge the need to supply personal information
in exchange for other values.
Finally, information is the lifeblood of state government’s operations and is indispensable in
implementing the policy choices of elected leaders. As such, restrictions on the government’s
information practices (and this is equally true of restrictions on private sector practices)
should be subject to a cost/benefit analysis. For example, you can’t provide human service
benefits effectively, or detect fraud, without gathering a great deal of personal information.
Nor can you tax, regulate, or perform a host of other government services without such
information. And you can’t have an open, accountable government without allowing broad
public access to government information. So, it is important to bear in mind that the resolution
of most of the issues presented here requires striking the correct balance rather than picking
the right side.
The Current Situation in Massachusetts: Government Information Practices
The principal laws governing the government’s collection, use, and dissemination of personal
information are the Public Records Law (PRL) the Fair Information Practices Act (FIPA), and
a host of restrictions bound throughout the General Laws. Massachusetts also has a privacy
statute (M.G.L. c. 214, s. 1B), enacted in 1974, which provides: “A person shall have a right
against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy.” The SJC has said
this statute codifies the common law privacy torts, but it is of little relevance for government
records because the SJC has ruled that it affords less privacy protection than the non-
disclosure provisions of the PRL. While somewhat convoluted and obscure, this combination
of laws establishes restrictions on the use of personal information that are more robust than
those of many, perhaps most, states. Improvements can and should be made, but it is not true
that Massachusetts lacks a statutory framework for protecting informational privacy.
The starting point for considering informational privacy is the PRL, which divides all
government information into public and non-public records. In general, all government
records, including computer files, are available for public inspection or copying unless they
fall within one or more of twelve exemptions. The first exemption is for records “specifically
or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute.” I am unaware of any
comprehensive compilation of these restrictions, but I am presently working my way through
a list of over 200 sections of the General Laws that contain the words “confidential” or
“confidentiality” and over 50 sections that contain the word “privacy.”
Next, the PRL exempts several specific types of records: internal personnel rules and
practices, policy memoranda, notebooks, investigatory records, trade secrets, pre-selection
procurement documents, real property appraisals, information on licensed gun owners, test
questions and answers, and health care contracts between public entities and HMOs. In
addition to these specific restrictions, the PRL exempts “personnel and medical files or
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information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the
disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” This
exemption is patterned after a similar, though more narrowly worded exemption in the federal
Freedom of Information Act that applies to information “which w uld constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
The meaning and interpretation of the PRL’s personal privacy exemption is critical because,
as will be seen below, there are no restrictions on the government’s collection, use, and
dissemination of personal information that is deemed to be public. In general, the SJC and the
Supervisor of Public Records have taken a narrow view of the privacy exemption, ruling that
it only applies to “intimate details of a highly personal nature.” The SJC has shown little
inclination to view more mundane types of personal information as falling within the
exemption even though the U.S. Supreme Court, in interpreting the seemingly more narrow
federal exemption, has found it far more favorable towards privacy rights.
In particular, the court has ruled that even if a record is merely a compilation of public facts
(such as a rap sheet) that “does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting
disclosure or dissemination of the information.” In addition, in upholding an agency’s refusal
to provide a list of its employee’s home addresses to their union, the court ruled that “the only
relevant public interest in disclosure to be weighed in this balance is the extent to which
disclosure would serve the core purpose of the FOIA, which is contributing significantly to
public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. That purpose,
however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is
accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s
own conduct.”
There are no restrictions on the government’s collection, use, and dissemination of personal
information that does not fall within one of the PRL’s exemptions. The law containing such
restrictions is the FIPA, enacted in 1975, which expressly excludes from its coverage any
personal data contained in a public record. For non-public personal data the FIPA requires
agencies holding such data to: identify a person responsible for FIPA compliance; inform its
employees of the FIPA’s requirements; not allow access to personal data unless authorized by
statute or regulations or unless approved by the data subject; maintain a complete record of
every access to and every use of personal data; make available to a data subject a list of the
uses made of the personal data; make personal data available to a data subject; establish
procedures for data subjects to contest the accuracy of their data; and not collect or maintain
more personal data than is needed.
